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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of geographical neighbors on the political insta-
bility of a country and the role of a country’s international relations in shaping the
impact of its geographical neighbors. First, we show that political instability in neigh-
bor countries has a strong positive impact on a given country’s political instability.
Second, we test whether international relations can reduce this impact of geographical
neighbors. We find that more active participation in international governmental orga-
nizations is associated with lower impact of neighbor countries’ political instability on a
given country’s political instability. Moreover, a country’s dependence on its neighbors
can be reduced when six or more main trade partners are non-neighbors. Our results
indicate that international relations can be an efficient counterforce to the so-called
“neighbor’s curse.”
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1 Introduction
Politics and economics are closely interrelated in modern societies. Changes in political power
lead to changes in economic policy, and the evolution of an economy over time influences po-
litical attitudes. Understanding the determinants of political and economic indicators is
complicated by the fact that economies do not evolve in isolation. International relations,
including trade, political and military linkages, may shape the characteristics and the de-
velopment path of a given economy. A nation can strategically choose other countries as
economic partners to facilitate economic growth. It can become a member of economic, mil-
itary, or other blocks that support a particular ideology or development strategy. At the
same time, a country may find itself surrounded by social and political unrest due to events
in neighbor countries. We can distinguish between the international influence considered in-
herent by a country, indicated by factors such as social ties with geographical neighbors, and
international influence that is adopted and modifiable, such as a country’s main international
trade partners. The latter, being an outcome of a country’s policies, could potentially impose
the peer effects desired by policymakers. The former has been widely discussed in the litera-
ture as the “neighborhood effect” (see Topa and Zenou, 2015; Ioannides and Topa, 2010; and
Durlauf, 2004 for recent reviews of the related studies, including various applications). A
neighborhood can impose positive or negative peer effects, depending on its characteristics.
Whenever a neighborhood has undesirable effects, policies aimed at dissipating its impact
through deeper international relations may be a remedy.
In this study we analyze the impact of geographical neighbors on the political instability
of a country and the role of a country’s international relations in shaping the impact of its
geographical neighbors. We use two different measures of political instability, the traditional
index by the World Bank and a new measure of political turnover constructed using the
Archidos dataset (Goemans et al., 2009). We employ the neighbors neighbors’ average po-
litical instability and the average neighbors’ latitude squared as instruments for the average
neighbors’ political instability to identify the causal effect on a given country’s political insta-
bility. We show that the neighbors’ instability positively and significantly affects a country’s
political instability. This result is robust to inclusion of the fundamental factors considered
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to be the main determinants of political instability.
Given that geographical neighbors are a fixed factor that cannot be altered, it is crucial to
recognize efficient methods of counteracting its possible negative impact on another country’s
economy. International economic relations look like the most straightforward solution. By
diverting resources to politically stable and economically successful economies, a country can
reduce the social connections with its neighbors and, potentially, the negative impact of po-
litically unstable neighbors. To that end, we investigate whether more intensive international
relations can reduce the impact of a country’s neighbors on its political instability.
We consider three different categories of measures of intensity of international relations:
participation in international intergovernmental organizations, trade openness, and the char-
acteristics of main trade partners. We obtain several results. First, in general, more active
participation in international governmental organizations is associated with lower impact
of neighbors’ political instability on a given country’s political instability. Second, greater
openness to trade does not significantly reduce the impact of neighbors’ political instability
on a given country’s political instability. Third, a country’s dependence on neighbors can be
reduced when six or more main trade partners are non-neighbors. The main trade partners-
nonneighbors tend to be much more politically stable and economically developed than main
trade partners-neighbors. Thus, international relations can be an efficient counterforce to
the negative influence of geographical neighbors, and it is used in practice.
Quantifying the effects of political distortions imposed by politically unstable neighbor
countries and the counteracting effect of international relations with non-neighbor countries
is important from an economic and policy standpoint. From economic perspective, a nation’s
government budget should be correctly adjusted for the expenses necessary to maintain po-
litical stability given the situation in its neighbor countries. From policy perspective, the
economic strategy of a country may depend on the expected impact of a particular inter-
national partner on its political stability and economic performance. These issues are of
particular importance for developing countries located in politically unstable regions and
aiming to escape the poverty trap. The problem is that such countries usually have a limited
ability to form relations with their preferred economies. Political instability, bad investment
climates, and policy uncertainty frighten off potential investors and trade partners. In this
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case, the lead to cooperate from more economically and politically successful countries can
be crucial.
Our findings suggest that recent trends in the politics of developed countries like nations
in the European Union, the United States, and Canada, which tend to impose sanctions on
economies characterized by political unrest, at the same time, encouraging the neighbors of
these economies to interact more with developed countries by offering special trade agree-
ments, should reduce political instability in the countries surrounded by politically unstable
neighbors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the concept of
political instability, its definition, measures, and determinants. It also evaluates the impact
of the average neighbors’ political instability on a given country’s political instability. Section
3 discusses the role of international relations in shaping the impact of geographical neighbors
on a country’s political instability. Section 4 concludes.
2 The International Nature of Political Instability
Political instability is a broad concept that can refer to the likelihood of riots, revolutions
and other forms of violence as well as to the probability of major changes in the government
such as those caused by re-elections (according to the definition by the World Bank). When
political instability is used to describe the political elections and changes in the government,
it is also referred to as political turnover or political uncertainty.
Political instability has a strong and direct effect on economic performance through a
number of channels. Several studies have shown that political frictions in the form of po-
litical instability and polarization are the main cause of public debt (Persson and Svensson,
1989; Alesina and Tabellini, 1990), high distortionary taxes and government overspending
(Battaglini and Coate, 2008; Yared, 2010), lead to lower levels of output and investment
(Azzimonti, 2011), amplify economic fluctuations (Azzimonti and Talbert, 2014; Alt and
Lassen, 2006) affect income inequality (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006), impair the
long run welfare in the economy (Azzimonti, 2011) and, eventually, the development path of
the economy (Frye, 2002).
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Given its abstract nature, political instability is not easy to measure. The literature
has considered several approaches that provide estimates comparable across countries. One
approach is to use the standardized surveys that evaluate the citizen opinion regarding the
extent of political instability. An example of the corresponding measure of political insta-
bility is the Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism index by the World Bank
(World Bank Governance Indicators) which measures perceptions of the likelihood of politi-
cal instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism. Another approach
is to count the number of riots, revolutions and other forms of violence or the number of
changes in the government over certain time interval and to measure the political instability
as the probability of occurrence of such events (see Aisen and Veiga, 2008). Alternatively, an
estimate can be computed as a common component in a large number of variables associated
with political instability (see Jong-A-Pin, 2009).
In this study we use two measures of political instability: the opposite values of the
World Bank Governance indicator (WBDI) of Political Stability and Absence of Violence
and a probability of the change of effective political leader constructed with data from the
Archidos dataset (Goemans et al., 2009). The former measure reflects a broader concept of
instability including the likelihood of riots, revolutions and other forms of violence. The latter
measure reflects a narrower concept of instability, political turnover. We compute political
turnover as the ratio of the number of regular changes of effective political leader to the total
number of changes of effective political leader using the data on political leaders entry and
exit during 1970-2014, or shorter period when the earliest available date is after 1970.1 The
total number of changes of effective leader consists of regular and irregular changes. A loss of
office is considered irregular when the leader was removed in contravention of explicit rules
and established conventions (Goemans et al., 2009). We define the regular changes of effective
political leader as those done according to the prevailing rules, provisions, conventions and
norms of the country or because of natural death or retirement due to poor health. The
1According to Goemans et al., (2009), effective leader means the person that de facto exercised power in
a country. In parliamentary regimes, the Prime Minister is coded as the leader, in presidential systems, the
President. In regimes that combine elements of both parliamentary and presidential systems the president
is coded as the leader since in these regimes presidents typically control foreign policy. In communist states
the Chairman of the Party is generally coded as the effective ruler.
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constructed probability of political turnover is zero for some countries. For the World Bank
measure, we compute the averages over 1996–2014 to obtain the cross-section data.2
We denote the political instability measure from the World Bank as PIS 1 and the politi-
cal turnover measure based on the Archidos data as PIS 2. The correlation between these two
political instability measures is 0.50. Table 6 in the Appendix reports the summary statistics
for these and other variables for the entire sample of countries for which the data is available
and for developing countries separately. Political instability is significantly larger in develop-
ing world, consistent with the fact that the quality of institutions is strongly correlated with
economic development.
Despite the importance of political instability for the economy, there is little understand-
ing of the efficient ways of dealing with it. The fundamental factors such as population size,
geography, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization are considered to be its main determinants
in the long run. For example, Easterly and Levine (1997) find that high ethnic fragmenta-
tion explains political instability in Africa; Goldstone et al. (2010) use a range of political,
economic, and social variables to forecast political instability and conclude that political in-
stitutions are the most powerful predictor of political instability episodes. The fundamental
factors provide fairly good account for the differences in political instability across countries.
Figure 1 presents the scatterplots of political instability as a function of latitude and eth-
nolinguistic polarization. There is high correlation in all pairs of variables, suggesting that
closeness to the Equator and higher variability of ethnic origins in a country are associated
with higher political instability.
The determinants of the dynamics of political instability are less understood, partially
due to the reverse causality.3 Figure 2 presents the time series of political instability measure
PIS 1 for several countries. The variable is relatively persistent over time, regardless of the
level of economic development and the type of political regime.
One important consideration that has not enjoyed much attention in the literature on the
nature of political instability is the role of international relations. Both fundamental factors
2We do not consider the panel data because of low variation in political instability over time.
3For example, lower levels of economic development cause greater political instability which in turn affects
economic development; income inequality and democracy are other potential endogenous determinants of
political instability over time (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006; Esteban and Ray, 2011).
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Figure 1: Political Instability and Fundamental Factors
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Note: The top and bottom panels show the scatterplots for PIS 1 and PIS 2 measures of political
instability, respectively. The left and right panels have Latitude and Ethnolonguistic Fractionalization,
respectively, on the x-axis.
Figure 2: Political Instability Over Time
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Note: The graph shows PIS 1 measure of political instability computed using data from the World Bank.
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(such as location and characteristics of neighbors) and international economic linkages (such
as the number of trading partners and their characteristics) can shape the nature of political
instability in a country. By studying the role of these factors, we aim to contribute to the
discussion on how to improve economic performance by improving the political climate in a
country.
2.1 The Neighbor Effect
Recent research has demonstrated that regional instability, defined as political instability
in neighbor countries, has a strong negative effect on a country’s economic performance.
In particular, Ades and Chua (1997) discussed the implications for a country’s economy
of having politically unstable neighbors, calling the phenomenon “the neighbor’s curse.”
The idea is that having politically unstable geographical neighbors influences a country’s
pattern of government spending and investment, leading to lower economic growth rates
(macroeconomic effect). Besides, political instability in neighbor countries can affect political
attitudes in a given economy through social interactions, imposing further distortions on
economic development (microeconomic effect).
In this section, we discuss the importance of regional instability for political instability in a
given country. We define neighbors of a country as the countries that have common borders
with a given country. The criterion of having the common borders is important for our
purposes. Social networks play a role in shaping political opinions (Axelrod, 1997; Baldassarri
and Bearman, 2007; and Iversen and Soskice, 2015). The citizens from the countries which
share common borders are more likely to interact with each other through travels, common
relatives, similar culture and ethnicity. The social proximity combined with geographical
proximity that characterizes contiguous countries can give rise to the “neighborhood effect,”
defined as a significant impact of the regional characteristics on a given country (Topa and
Zenou, 2015).
As a measure of neighbors’ political instability, which we denote ANPIS, we use the
average political instability computed over all the neighbors of a country. We also tried
the weighted average neighbors’ political instability with weights defined by the neighbors’
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Table 1: Political Instability across Different Country Groups
All Countries Developing Countries Developed Countries
Criterion PIS 1 PIS 2 PIS 1 PIS 2 PIS 1 PIS 2
Contiguous neighbors 2.152 0.152 2.367 0.168 1.116 0.053
(0.956) (0.218) (0.857) (0.221) (0.600) (0.157)
No contiguous neighbors 1.336 0.091 1.529 0.145 0.911 0.019
(0.724) (0.158) (0.778) (0.186) (0.308) (0.045)
Average over contiguous neighbors 2.260 0.153 2.434 0.176 1.495 0.047
(0.706) (0.168) (0.573) (0.164) (0.665) (0.129)
Average over main trading partners 1.688 0.027 1.755 0.032 1.338 0.010
(0.813) (0.088) (0.815) (0.089) (0.622) (0.080)
Average over main trading partners-neighbors 2.064 0.071 2.394 0.103 1.304 0.003
(1.005) (0.136) (0.964) (0.152) (0.516) (0.018)
Average over main trading partners-nonneighbors 1.593 0.017 1.621 0.018 1.356 0.014
(0.726) (0.068) (0.711) (0.062) (0.673) (0.098)
Note: Each entry is the mean value of the variable specified in the column header with the standard error
in parentheses. Data sources: PIS 1 – World Bank; PIS 2 – computed using data from Goemans et al.,
(2009) ; trade and contiguity data – from Fouquin and Hugot (2016).
characteristics such as area, population size, and real GDP per capita, for robustness checks.4
The correlations between the weighted and unweighted average neighbors’ political instability
measures is above 0.95 and the results reported in this paper are not affected significantly
by different weightings. Therefore, we only report the results for the unweighted averages.
As a starting point, we compare the political instability across different groups of coun-
tries. Table 1 reports the results. We observe that the countries which have contiguous
geographical neighbors are much more politically unstable and have higher political turnover
than the island countries with no contiguous neighbors. This implies that there is some
association between the regional instability and a given country instability. Furthermore,
on average, the political instability of a country’s contiguous neighbors is much higher than
the political instability of a country’s main trading partner. These results hold regardless
of the level of economic development. Looking at the main trade partners only, the politi-
cal instability of the main trade partners-neighbors is significantly higher than the political
instability of the main trade partners-nonneighbors when the whole sample of countries is
considered or when the sample is restricted to developing countries. In developed countries,
the opposite pattern holds: the political instability of the main trade partners-nonneighbors
is significantly higher than the political instability of the main trading partners-neighbors.
4For example, the average neighbors’ political instability weighted by the area is computed as the average
political instability over all the neighbors of a country weighted by the neighbor country size as a fraction of
the total area of neighbors.
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Figure 3: Political Instability by Region
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Note: The left and right panels show the average country’s political instability (in squares) and the average
neighbor countries’ political instability (in diamonds) by region for the PIS 1 and PIS 2 measures of
political instability, respectively.
We rely on these observations to formulate the following hypothesis: countries use trading
partners to reduce the negative impact of their neighbors’ political instability. Before test-
ing this hypothesis in the next section, we analyze the dependence of a country’s political
instability on its partners’ political instability in more detail.
Given that political instability is to a great extent determined by the fundamental factors
such as geographical location and ethnolinguistic fractionalization, a given country’s and
its neighbors’ political instability may be jointly determined by the regional factors. Indeed,
when classified by regions, the political instability of a country and its neighbors move closely
together, with correlation 0.90 across all the countries in the sample. Figure 3 reports
the average country’s political instability and the average neighbors’ political instability by
region. There is high variability in political instability by region with Scandinavian region
being the most politically stable and Central Asia being the most politically unstable.
We quantify the relationship between a country’s and its neighbors’ political instability
using OLS and IV approaches to estimate the following model:
PISi = β0 + β1ANPISi + γXi + i, (1)
where PISi denotes country i’s measure of political instability, ANPISi denotes country i’s
average neighbors’ political instability, and Xi is a set of country-specific control variables.
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When PIS is measured by PIS 1, ANPIS is measured by the average neighbor countries’
PIS 1; and when PIS is measured by PIS 2, ANPIS is measured by the average neighbor
countries’ PIS 2. The control variables include the logarithm of population, the logarithm of
area in kilometers squared, latitude squared, longitude, and ethnolinguistic fractionalization.
For robustness check, we also consider an extended version of the model where the logarithm
of real GDP per capita and democracy index for a given country and the averages of neighbor
countries’ area and population are included as additional controls.5 The data on control
variables is from the World Bank, except for ethnolinguistic fractionalization which is taken
from Alesina et al., (2003). The summary statistics are in Table 6 in the Appendix.
Table 2 reports the estimates, for all countries in the sample and for the sample restricted
to developing countries.6
The coefficient of the average neighbors’ political instability is positive, significant, and
robust to the inclusion of controls in all the specifications except for the case when PIS 2
is the dependent variable and the logarithm of real GDP per capita is included as a control
(Columns (3) and (8) in the bottom panel of Table 2).
Given that the dependent and explanatory political instability measures can be jointly
determined by the geographical or historical factors, and a given country can influence the
political climate of its neighbors, we instrument the average neighbors’ political instability
by the average neighbors neighbors’ political instability, excluding the country for which the
average neighbors’ political instability is calculated, and by the average neighbors’ latitude
squared.
The idea behind the first instrument is that even though a country’s political climate can
affect the neighbor countries, it cannot have a significant impact on all the neighbors of the
neighbor countries. At the same time, the neighbors of the neighbor countries have a direct
impact on these countries’ political situation, so that the instrument should explain some
fraction of this endogenous regressor.7
5The GDP and democracy index are important but endogenous predictors of political instability.
6We do not estimate the model for the sample restricted to developed countries because of the small
sample size; many developed countries do not have contiguous neighbors and therefore cannot be included
in the estimation.
7This identification strategy has been introduced by Bramoulle´, et al. (2009) to study the peer effects in
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The idea behind the second instrument is that the average latitude over all the neighbors
is a factor characterizing the region and is not influenced by the dependent variable, a given
country’s political instability. We use latitude squared because it has better fit that the linear
latitude term.
Columns (4)-(5) and (9)-(10) of Table 2 report the IV estimation results. The neighbors’
political instability remains a significant explanatory variable for a given country’s political
instability. The Hansen test suggests that the instruments are valid and the Cragg-Donald
Wald F-statistics imply that the instruments are relevant in all the specifications. When PIS 1
is considered as dependent variable, the exogeneity of neighbors’ political instability cannot
be rejected according to the endogeneity test, implying that OLS results are more efficient.
Notwithstanding, the OLS and IV results are very similar in all the cases, therefore we
conclude that higher average neighbors’ political instability leads to higher political instability
in a given country, keeping other things constant. The estimated coefficients suggest that
one unit increase in the average neighbors’ political instability causes an increase in a given
country’s political instability from around half of a unit to around one unit, depending on
the specification. The results are similar for the full sample and for the sample restricted to
developing countries. The coefficients on the average neighbors’ political instability are lower
when the sample is restricted to developing countries. However, when computed over the
average values, the impact of the average neighbors’ political instability in the whole sample
is not statistically different from that in the sample restricted to developing countries. This
is due to the fact that political instability is greater in developing countries.
Given the significance of neighbors’ influence on a given country’s political climate, in
the next section, we ask whether there is a possibility to reduce the negative impact of
geographical neighbors by developing international relations with non-neighbor countries.
incomplete networks. The set of countries can be considered as a network with links representing relations
across different countries. In this case, the network is incomplete if a country has links with its geographical
neighbors but not with its neighbors’ neighbors.
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Table 2: Political Instability and the Neighbor Effect
All Countries Developing Countries
Dependent: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PIS 1 OLS OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS OLS IV IV
ANPIS 1 0.850*** 0.727*** 0.488*** 0.910*** 0.850*** 0.676*** 0.540*** 0.400*** 0.734*** 0.588***
(0.0752) (0.104) (0.124) (0.102) (0.144) (0.117) (0.118) (0.121) (0.186) (0.179)
LAREA -0.0337 -0.0266 -0.0336 -0.143** -0.0904 -0.139**
(0.0626) (0.0530) (0.0572) (0.0683) (0.0690) (0.0667)
LPOP 0.204*** 0.189*** 0.201*** 0.273*** 0.232*** 0.269***
(0.0552) (0.0487) (0.0520) (0.0560) (0.0582) (0.0550)
LATITUDE SQ -0.988 -0.137 -0.549 -0.926 -0.479 -0.851
(0.752) (0.616) (0.827) (0.827) (0.773) (0.801)
POLARIZ 0.472* 0.251 0.436* 0.589** 0.347 0.567**
(0.262) (0.236) (0.258) (0.284) (0.293) (0.285)
AN LPOP -0.0912 -0.0951 -0.106 -0.128 -0.126 -0.134
(0.0781) (0.0718) (0.0772) (0.0875) (0.0865) (0.0839)
AN LAREA 0.0131 -0.00759 0.00254 0.132 0.0866 0.129
(0.0796) (0.0645) (0.0786) (0.0927) (0.0823) (0.0916)
DEMOCRACY -0.0230 -0.0368*
(0.0199) (0.0219)
LGDP -0.183*** -0.150**
(0.0509) (0.0650)
Cons. 0.208 -1.186 1.453 0.0722 -1.056 0.697** -1.420 0.874 0.551 -1.390
(0.174) (1.114) (1.192) (0.231) (1.070) (0.295) (1.092) (1.454) (0.458) (1.049)
Obs. 122 122 122 122 122 100 100 100 100 100
R-sq 0.460 0.606 0.664 0.457 0.601 0.238 0.437 0.498 0.236 0.436
Hansen p-val 0.0599 0.3851 0.0769 0.7007
Endog p-val 0.4912 0.5278 0.6073 0.9148
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat 114.571 44.019 46.819 27.930
All Countries Developing Countries
Dependent: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PIS 2 OLS OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS OLS IV IV
ANPIS 2 0.529*** 0.389*** 0.179 1.032*** 0.969*** 0.441*** 0.373** 0.138 0.968*** 0.918***
(0.143) (0.145) (0.141) (0.208) (0.234) (0.154) (0.151) (0.148) (0.242) (0.245)
LAREA -0.0348 -0.0318* -0.0381* -0.0670** -0.0311 -0.0659**
(0.0235) (0.0184) (0.0213) (0.0285) (0.0269) (0.0283)
LPOP 0.0177 0.0183 0.0194 0.0359 0.0160 0.0327
(0.0207) (0.0165) (0.0204) (0.0232) (0.0197) (0.0239)
LATITUDE SQ -0.487** 0.141 -0.236 -0.584** 0.0779 -0.349
(0.203) (0.246) (0.235) (0.253) (0.292) (0.279)
LONGITUDE 0.0332 -0.0556* 0.00947 0.0481 -0.0562 0.0299
(0.0367) (0.0335) (0.0372) (0.0448) (0.0424) (0.0462)
POLARIZ -0.00388 -0.0218 -0.0928 0.00410 -0.0655 -0.0932
(0.104) (0.0936) (0.0979) (0.126) (0.110) (0.120)
AN LPOP -0.0427 -0.0362 -0.0247 -0.0654* -0.0593* -0.0507
(0.0272) (0.0253) (0.0259) (0.0369) (0.0348) (0.0368)
AN LAREA 0.0569** 0.0409* 0.0498* 0.0864** 0.0579* 0.0824**
(0.0259) (0.0238) (0.0264) (0.0348) (0.0338) (0.0375)
DEMOCRACY -0.0217** -0.0211**
(0.0101) (0.00982)
LGDP -0.0482** -0.0865***
(0.0188) (0.0244)
Cons. 0.0767*** 0.272 0.827** 0.00636 0.00916 0.106*** 0.381 1.322*** 0.0186 0.167
(0.0200) (0.335) (0.330) (0.0240) (0.371) (0.0272) (0.442) (0.466) (0.0362) (0.479)
Obs. 120 120 120 120 120 97 97 97 97 97
R-sq 0.142 0.225 0.347 0.014 0.101 0.094 0.184 0.340 -0.041 0.070
Hansen p-val 0.6125 0.7964 0.7072 0.9668
Endog p-val 0.0000 0.0025 0.0007 0.0063
Cragg-Donald Wald F stat 73.716 44.937 47.905 34.802
Note: The top and bottom panels show the results for PIS 1 and PIS 2 measures of political instability,
with ANPISi defined as the average neighbors political instability PIS 1 and PIS 2, respectively.
AN LPOP and AN LAREA denote the average neighbors’ population and area, respectively. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3 Can Economic Relations Reduce the Neighbor Ef-
fect?
A country can potentially diversify the impact of its geographical neighbors by pursuing
a more active role in international political and economic relations. For example, being a
NATO (The North Atlantic Treaty Organization) ally potentially makes a country more pro-
tected from military threats from aggressive neighbors. Similarly, being an active member
of international trade and capital networks can reduce a country’s dependence on its geo-
graphical (or other fundamental) factors. The interactions between local firms and foreign
firms from non-contiguous countries could potentially reduce the social connections between
a country and its geographical neighbors and alter the customs and beliefs of the local econ-
omy established (partially) through neighbor countries’ influence. The problematic issue is
that the involvement of a country with international allies and in economic relations is sig-
nificantly affected by the state of that country’s institutions and economic development. A
country may find itself in a trap where it is surrounded by politically unstable neighbors (or
one powerful and politically unstable neighbor), which precludes its development and tran-
sition into the global economy. In this situation, recognition of the problem by international
society and help from international organizations may be crucial. The question is whether
international influence can have a significant effect on a country and whether it can liberate
a country from “the neighbor’s curse.”
We seek to answer this question by estimating a number of specifications of the following
general model:
PISi = β0 + β1ANPISi + β2INTERi + β1ANPISi ∗ INTERi + γXi + i, (2)
where, as before, PISi denotes country i’s measure of political instability, ANPISi de-
notes country i’s average neighbors’ political instability, INTERi is a measure of the intensity
of international relations, and Xi is a set of country-specific control variables. The control
variables are the same as those used in equation (1). By considering the interaction term
ANPISi ∗ INTERi, we evaluate whether more intensive international relations reduce the
positive impact of political instability on a given country’s political instability.
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We use several measures of INTERi, as discussed in more detail below.
3.1 Measuring the Partner Effect
We consider three broad categories of the measures of intensity of international relations:
involvement in international organizations, trade openness, and characteristics of the main
trading partners. For the first category, we extract the data, sourced from Marshall et al.
(1999), from the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et al., 2016). For the second and
third categories, we use data on historical bilateral trade flows collected by Fouquin and
Hugot (2016). Summary statistics are reported in Table 6 in the Appendix.
The first category consists of several measures of memberships in conventional intergov-
ernmental organizations from 1952-1997. We use the following variables (notation used in
parentheses):8 a dummy for membership in the Council of Europe (CE); a dummy for mem-
bership in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); the total amount of
memberships in all non-profit international organizations with a widespread, geographically-
balanced membership, management and policy-control (ORGB);9 the total amount of mem-
berships in all international non-profit organizations, whose membership and preoccupations
exceed that of a particular continental region, although not to a degree justifying its inclu-
sion in the previous type (ORGC); and the total amount of memberships for all international
non-profit organizations, whose membership or preoccupations are restricted to a particular
continent or sub continental region (ORGD).
The idea behind the use of these variables is that a country that actively participates
in international intergovernmental organizations has more chances to diversify the inflow of
political ideas from abroad and to use international organizations to partially protect itself
from the negative impacts of politically unstable neighbors.
8We exclude from consideration the organizations the participation in which is widespread with more
than 90% of countries participating, such as the United Nations, or is characterized by membership of mainly
developed countries, such as Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
9The rule applied to count the number of memberships of this type is that there should be members in
at least 60 countries, or else in more than 30 countries provided that the distribution between continents is
“well-balanced.”
15
T
ab
le
3:
P
ol
it
ic
al
In
st
ab
il
it
y
an
d
th
e
P
ar
tn
er
E
ff
ec
t:
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
s
A
ll
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
D
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t:
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
(1
3
)
P
IS
1
C
E
O
P
E
C
O
R
G
B
O
R
G
B
O
R
G
C
O
R
G
D
C
E
O
P
E
C
O
P
E
C
O
R
G
B
O
R
G
B
O
R
G
C
O
R
G
D
A
N
P
I
S
i
0
.6
9
2
*
*
*
0
.8
6
8
*
*
*
0
.3
7
5
0
.4
6
0
.7
1
4
*
*
*
0
.7
4
5
*
*
*
0
.5
6
9
*
*
*
0
.7
1
7
*
*
*
0
.5
4
5
*
*
*
0
.2
8
4
0
.2
7
5
0
.5
4
6
*
*
0
.8
1
2
*
*
*
(0
.1
3
2
)
(0
.0
7
8
9
)
(
0
.3
3
5
)
(0
.2
7
8
)
(0
.1
7
6
)
(0
.1
5
4
)
(0
.1
3
1
)
(0
.1
1
5
)
(0
.1
1
9
)
(0
.4
1
8
)
(0
.3
3
3
)
(0
.2
1
8
)
(0
.2
3
6
)
I
N
T
E
R
i
-0
.3
8
9
*
*
0
.2
6
7
0
.0
0
4
3
1
-0
.0
2
8
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
0
4
0
7
-0
.0
0
2
0
6
-0
.2
4
8
0
.7
7
5
*
*
0
.6
1
6
*
*
0
.0
0
9
4
9
-0
.0
2
8
5
*
*
0
.0
1
3
1
0
.0
0
9
0
6
(0
.1
9
)
(0
.2
8
7
)
(0
.0
0
9
2
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
9
8
)
(0
.0
1
4
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
5
6
)
(0
.2
0
4
)
(0
.3
2
8
)
(0
.3
0
9
)
(0
.0
1
0
7
)
(0
.0
1
1
4
)
(0
.0
1
9
4
)
(0
.0
0
8
7
3
)
A
N
P
I
S
i
×
0
.0
4
0
8
-0
.1
9
9
0
.0
1
8
6
0
.0
0
5
3
6
0
.0
1
6
1
0
.0
0
6
0
6
0
.3
4
1
-0
.8
9
9
*
-0
.6
8
1
*
0
.0
1
8
6
0
.0
0
9
3
9
0
.0
2
3
5
-0
.0
1
0
4
I
N
T
E
R
i
(0
.2
0
8
)
(0
.5
0
6
)
(0
.0
1
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
9
5
6
)
(0
.0
1
6
3
)
(0
.0
0
6
8
4
)
(0
.2
5
1
)
(0
.4
7
6
)
(0
.3
9
5
)
(0
.0
1
6
4
)
(0
.0
1
2
6
)
(0
.0
3
0
5
)
(0
.0
1
6
3
)
C
o
n
s.
2
.2
6
1
*
*
*
2
.1
4
5
*
*
*
2
.1
0
0
*
*
*
-1
.2
7
7
*
2
.1
8
5
*
*
*
2
.2
0
6
*
*
*
2
.3
4
0
*
*
*
2
.2
2
2
*
*
*
-0
.4
2
8
2
.0
6
3
*
*
*
-1
.1
5
7
2
.1
9
5
*
*
*
2
.1
5
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
5
9
)
(0
.0
5
8
9
)
(0
.2
3
5
)
(0
.6
7
6
)
(0
.1
0
6
)
(0
.1
1
)
(0
.0
7
8
3
)
(0
.0
6
6
3
)
(0
.6
8
3
)
(0
.2
6
2
)
(0
.7
6
3
)
(0
.1
1
7
)
(0
.1
2
7
)
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
N
O
N
O
N
O
Y
E
S
N
O
N
O
N
O
N
O
Y
E
S
N
O
Y
E
S
N
O
N
O
O
b
s.
1
3
5
1
3
5
1
3
5
1
3
5
1
3
5
1
3
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
R
-s
q
.
0
.4
4
7
0
.4
3
2
0
.4
3
7
0
.5
7
2
0
.4
3
0
.4
2
9
0
.2
5
3
0
.2
7
7
0
.4
2
7
0
.2
4
7
0
.4
1
9
0
.2
4
0
.2
3
5
A
ll
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
D
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t:
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
(1
3
)
(1
4
)
P
IS
2
C
E
O
P
E
C
O
P
E
C
O
R
G
B
O
R
G
C
O
R
G
C
O
R
G
D
C
E
O
P
E
C
O
P
E
C
O
R
G
B
O
R
G
C
O
R
G
C
O
R
G
D
A
N
P
I
S
i
0
.3
2
3
*
*
0
.6
2
3
*
*
*
0
.4
9
6
*
*
*
1
.0
6
4
*
0
.3
4
1
0
.2
8
5
0
.6
9
2
*
*
0
.2
9
8
*
0
.5
3
7
*
*
*
0
.4
6
1
*
*
*
1
.3
4
9
*
0
.3
7
1
0
.2
3
2
0
.8
1
7
*
*
*
(0
.1
5
4
)
(0
.1
4
1
)
(0
.1
5
1
)
(0
.5
4
9
)
(0
.2
0
6
)
(0
.2
1
5
)
(0
.2
7
9
)
(0
.1
5
9
)
(0
.1
5
5
)
(0
.1
6
3
)
(0
.7
1
7
)
(0
.2
3
1
)
(0
.2
5
2
)
(0
.3
0
2
)
I
N
T
E
R
i
-0
.1
6
9
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
9
1
0
.0
0
5
1
2
-0
.0
0
9
8
0
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
0
4
-0
.0
0
1
2
8
-0
.0
0
1
2
1
-0
.1
5
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
6
7
3
-0
.0
4
3
3
-0
.0
0
8
2
7
*
-0
.0
0
1
8
2
-0
.0
0
1
0
7
0
.0
0
2
0
7
(0
.0
3
1
9
)
(0
.0
8
0
1
)
(0
.0
8
5
1
)
(0
.0
0
3
7
9
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
6
7
6
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
8
)
(0
.0
4
2
7
)
(0
.0
6
3
9
)
(0
.0
7
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
4
3
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
8
)
(0
.0
0
7
9
1
)
(0
.0
0
3
2
8
)
A
N
P
I
S
i
×
-0
.2
2
-0
.7
3
5
*
*
-0
.6
3
1
*
-0
.0
2
8
0
.0
2
1
7
0
.0
1
6
9
-0
.0
1
0
4
0
.0
0
4
1
4
-0
.5
3
5
*
*
-0
.4
5
6
-0
.0
4
2
7
0
.0
0
8
3
0
.0
2
5
3
-0
.0
2
6
9
I
N
T
E
R
i
(0
.2
1
6
)
(0
.2
9
)
(
0
.3
2
9
)
(0
.0
2
4
7
)
(0
.0
3
2
8
)
(0
.0
3
7
3
)
(0
.0
1
4
6
)
(0
.2
9
4
)
(0
.2
4
5
)
(0
.3
0
6
)
(
0
.0
3
3
4
)
(0
.0
4
5
7
)
(0
.0
4
8
7
)
(0
.0
1
6
5
)
C
o
n
s.
0
.1
8
9
*
*
*
0
.1
6
3
*
*
*
0
.4
5
8
*
*
0
.3
9
0
*
*
*
0
.1
8
6
*
*
*
0
.3
4
8
0
.1
7
7
*
*
*
0
.1
9
3
*
*
*
0
.1
8
0
*
*
*
0
.4
7
5
*
0
.3
5
9
*
*
*
0
.1
8
0
*
*
*
0
.4
4
4
0
.1
5
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
2
3
3
)
(0
.0
2
0
6
)
(0
.2
1
2
)
(0
.0
9
2
6
)
(0
.0
3
5
3
)
(0
.2
7
7
)
(0
.0
4
1
4
)
(0
.0
2
4
4
)
(0
.0
2
2
9
)
(0
.2
5
)
(0
.1
0
4
)
(0
.0
3
6
3
)
(0
.3
1
4
)
(0
.0
5
0
3
)
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
N
O
N
O
Y
E
S
N
O
N
O
Y
E
S
N
O
N
O
N
O
Y
E
S
N
O
N
O
Y
E
S
N
O
O
b
s.
1
1
7
1
1
7
1
1
7
1
1
7
1
1
7
1
1
7
1
1
7
9
5
9
5
9
5
9
5
9
5
9
5
9
5
R
-s
q
.
0
.1
9
8
0
.1
6
8
0
.2
1
4
0
.2
0
5
0
.1
5
0
.1
9
2
0
.1
3
5
0
.1
3
2
0
.1
2
4
0
.1
6
4
0
.1
4
0
.0
8
5
0
.1
4
4
0
.1
0
6
N
o
te
:
T
h
e
to
p
an
d
b
ot
to
m
p
an
el
s
sh
ow
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
P
IS
1
a
n
d
P
IS
2
m
ea
su
re
s
o
f
p
o
li
ti
ca
l
in
st
a
b
il
it
y,
w
it
h
A
N
P
I
S
i
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
th
e
av
er
a
g
e
n
ei
gh
b
or
s
p
ol
it
ic
al
in
st
ab
il
it
y
P
IS
1
an
d
P
IS
2,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
I
N
T
E
R
i
is
d
efi
n
ed
a
s
st
a
te
d
in
th
e
co
lu
m
n
h
ea
d
er
.
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
**
*
p
<
0.
01
,
**
p
<
0.
05
,
*
p
<
0.
1
16
For estimation, we include one of the variables indicating participation in intergovern-
mental organizations at a time, to avoid multicollinearity. Table 3 reports the results. The
interaction term ANPISi ∗ INTERi is significant when INTERi indicates membership in
the OPEC. When INTERi is measured as the amount of memberships in organizations
ORGB or OGRC, the coefficient of average neighbors’ political instability becomes insignifi-
cant. These results are robust to the inclusion of controls. They hold in the full sample and
in the sample restricted to developing countries.
Thus, there is some evidence that a country’s more active participation in international
intergovernmental organizations reduces the impact of geographical neighbors on its political
instability. The organizations must be relatively widespread and reflect different geographi-
cal communities. The participation in international organizations restricted to a particular
region, such as CE or ORGD, are insufficient to dissipate the influence of geographical neigh-
bors. This can be due to the fact that politics of regional international organizations can be
affected by the politically unstable members which are also a given country’s geographical
neighbors. So, there is no counteracting peer effect from the membership in such organiza-
tions.
The second category consists of two measures of trade openness, reflecting the intensive
and extensive trade margins, respectively. The measures are the following: the total vol-
ume of trade computed as the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP (intensive
trade margin) and the total number of trade partners – countries with which a given country
has trade flows above 1% of GDP (extensive trade margin). Given that the geographical
proximity of a partner is important for the country’s political instability, we further distin-
guish between the trade volume with neighbors and the trade volume with non-neighbors, as
well as between the total number of trade partners-neighbors and the total number of trade
partner-nonneighbors. Again, for estimation, we include one of the variables at a time. The
estimation results reported in Table 4 suggest that greater trade openness does not reduce
the impact of geographical neighbors’ political instability on a given country’s political in-
stability. The interaction terms are insignificant or become insignificant when the control
variables are added. The coefficient of the neighbors’ political instability remains positive
and significant in all the specifications. This result is surprising because greater trade open-
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Table 4: Political Instability and the Partner Effect: Trade Openness
All Countries Developing Countries
Dependent: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PIS 1 VOL VOL NN PARTN PARTN NN VOL VOL NN PARTN PARTN PARTN NN PARTN NN
ANPISi 0.793*** 0.823*** 0.812*** 0.822*** 0.638*** 0.671*** 0.645*** 0.470*** 0.670*** 0.492***
(0.0718) (0.0908) (0.0859) (0.0742) (0.111) (0.125) (0.107) (0.106) (0.104) (0.106)
INTERi -0.445** 0.507 0.0175 0.0215 -0.308 0.533 0.00498 -0.0199 0.0107 -0.0164
(0.215) (0.33) (0.0126) (0.0138) (0.263) (0.37) (0.014) (0.0133) (0.016) (0.0143)
ANPISi× 0.432 0.329 0.024 0.0228 0.277 0.504 0.0466** 0.0241 0.0462* 0.0233
INTERi (0.297) (0.381) (0.0189) (0.0197) (0.396) (0.471) (0.023) (0.0208) (0.0263) (0.0249)
Cons. 2.141*** 2.131*** 2.112*** 2.112*** 2.237*** 2.233*** 2.225*** -0.938 2.216*** -0.769
(0.0556) (0.0605) (0.0589) (0.0551) (0.0658) (0.0716) (0.0657) (0.772) (0.0632) (0.734)
Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO NO YES NO YES
Obs. 136 136 136 136 110 110 110 110 110 110
R-sq. 0.462 0.459 0.464 0.463 0.253 0.275 0.280 0.460 0.278 0.453
All Countries Developing Countries
Dependent: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PIS 2 VOL VOL NN PARTN PARTN NN VOL VOL NN PARTN PARTN NN
ANPISi 0.537*** 0.433*** 0.514*** 0.528*** 0.453*** 0.366** 0.445*** 0.450***
(0.143) (0.141) (0.143) (0.145) (0.155) (0.151) (0.152) (0.154)
INTERi -0.0805 0.248* -0.00625 -0.00384 -0.107 0.269* -0.00588 -0.00311
(0.0713) (0.139) (0.00464) (0.00527) (0.101) (0.137) (0.00488) (0.00572)
ANPISi× -0.125 -0.11 0.0182 0.0128 -0.0384 0.00283 0.0199 0.0158
INTERi (0.196) (1.114) (0.0382) (0.0443) (0.269) (1.262) (0.0417) (0.0503)
Cons. 0.156*** 0.169*** 0.163*** 0.156*** 0.170*** 0.181*** 0.174*** 0.169***
(0.0194) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0204) (0.0214) (0.0227) (0.0225) (0.0221)
Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Obs. 118 118 118 118 95 95 95 95
R-sq. 0.162 0.192 0.172 0.155 0.117 0.143 0.119 0.105
Note: The top and bottom panels show the results for PIS 1 and PIS 2 measures of political instability,
with ANPISi defined as the average neighbors political instability PIS 1 and PIS 2, respectively. INTERi
is defined as stated in the column header. VOL denotes total trade volume; VOL NN denotes trade volume
with non-neighbors; PARTN denotes the number of total trade partners; and PARTN NN denotes the
number of total partners-nonneighbors. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
ness is supposed to increase a country’s possibilities to collaborate with foreign economies
and, potentially, to reduce “the neighbor’s curse.” Analysis of the third category of variables
describing international relations offers a potential explanation for this result.
The third category includes the main trade partners of the country, that is, the countries
with which a given country has the largest trade flows. The first main trade partner is
defined as the country with which a given country has the largest share of its trade flows.
The second main partner is defined as the country with which a given country has the largest
share of its trade flows, excluding the first main trade partner, and so on. Table 6 in the
Appendix reports the summary statistics of the shares of trade flows with the first eight
trading partners. On average across all the countries, around 30% of the total trade flows
are with the main trade partner; this number drops to 13% and 8% for the second and third
main trade partners, respectively. The eighth trade partner occupies approximately 2% of
the total trade flows of a country.
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Figure 4: Political Instability of the Main Trade Partners: Neighbors vs. Non-neighbors
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The figure shows the average political instability and its standard errors (left panel) and the average
logarithm of real GDP per capita and its standard errors (right panel) of the main trade partners-neighbors
(in squares) and main trade partners-nonneighbors (in diamonds).
Around half of the countries in the sample (54%) have a non-neighbor country as the
main trade partner; around a third of the countries have non-neighbor countries as the first
two main trade partners; and only around 15% of the countries have non-neighbors as the
first six main trade partners.
Before we saw that the main trade partners-nonneighbors are on average much more
politically stable than the main trade partners-neighbors (Table 1). Now we check the char-
acteristics of the other trade partners that have significant shares of trade flows in a given
country. Figure 4 shows that the neighbors and non-neighbors main trade partners are quite
different. There, we plot the average first, second, and so on till the eighth main trade part-
ner’s political instability (left panel) and the logarithm of real GDP per capita (right panel).
The main non-neighbor trading partners are persistently more politically stable and richer:
the significant difference remains even for the eighth main trade partner.
We use information on the main trade partners to evaluate their impact on the degree
to which neighbors’ political instability affects a given country’s political instability. The
estimations of the model (2) with INTERi defined as the share of trade with one, two, and
so on main trade partners, distinguishing between neighbors and non-neighbors, does not
deliver a significant coefficient on the interaction term ANPISi∗INTERi. This suggests that
the intensity of trade with non-neighbors does not help to reduce the influence of neighbors.
Next, we proxy INTERi by dummies for the country having one through eight main trade
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Table 5: Political Instability and the Partner Effect: Number of Main Partners-Nonneighbors
Dep.: PIS 1 All Countries, 134 Observations Developing Countries, 109 Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
INTERi=1 ANPISi INTERi ANPISi× Cons. R-sq. ANPISi INTERi ANPISi× const R-sq
if # of INTERi INTERi
main partners=
1 0.766*** 0.129 0.0773 2.043*** 0.447 0.578*** 0.139 0.129 2.138*** 0.258
(0.1) (0.113) (0.151) (0.0785) (0.141) (0.136) (0.23) (0.0839 )
2 0.820*** 0.0368 0.00129 2.106*** 0.441 0.653*** 0.0756 0.0121 2.195*** 0.247
(0.0819) (0.133) (0.202) (0.0673) (0.123) (0.168) (0.287) (0.0736)
3 0.852*** 0.136 -0.203 2.095*** 0.447 0.689*** 0.166 -0.167 2.184*** 0.252
(0.0803 ) (0.146) (0.211) (0.0644) (0.122) (0.169) (0.275 ) (0.0716)
4 0.826*** 0.245 -0.243 2.082*** 0.451 0.675*** 0.257 -0.17 2.171*** 0.261
(0.0766 ) (0.194) (0.319) (0.0612) (0.117) (0.186) (0.295 ) (0.0686)
5 0.846*** 0.31 -0.455 2.090*** 0.457 0.715*** 0.376** -0.476* 2.170*** 0.274
(0.0777 ) (0.22) (0.345 ) (0.0602) (0.117 ) (0.186) (0.26 ) (0.067)
6 0.837*** 0.367 -0.466 2.092*** 0.456 0.698*** 0.526*** -0.588** 2.172*** 0.282
(0.0774 ) (0.281) (0.421) (0.0597) (0.116) (0.198) (0.258 ) (0.066)
7 0.839*** 0.366 -0.499 2.094*** 0.456 0.704*** 0.532*** -0.627** 2.174*** 0.283
(0.0735) (0.283) ( 0.469) (0.0573) (0.11 ) (0.202) (0.264) (0.0648)
8 0.852*** 0.643*** -1.066*** 2.090*** 0.483 0.714*** 0.531** -0.724*** 2.176*** 0.284
(0.0724) (0.196) (0.287) (0.0563) (0.108) (0.207) (0.259 ) (0.0642)
8 + controls 0.431*** 0.510*** -0.680*** 1.157* 0.705 0.394*** 0.367** -0.698*** 1.046 0.569
(0.105) (0.193) (0.231) (0.617) (0.113) (0.176) (0.248) (0.699)
Dep.: PIS 2 All Countries, 116 Observations Developing Countries, 94 Observations
1 0.613** 0.0242 -0.171 0.146*** 0.158 0.512** 0.0174 -0.111 0.161*** 0.107
(0.237) (0.0427) (0.301) (0.0343) (0.255 ) (0.0457) (0.324 ) (0.0362))
2 0.467** 0.0747* -0.0192 0.132*** 0.174 0.362* 0.069 0.069 0.145*** 0.126
(0.191) (0.044) (0.299) (0.0262) (0.209) (0.0468) (0.318) (0.0275)
3 0.501*** 0.121** -0.204 0.128*** 0.204 0.431*** 0.116** -0.156 0.141*** 0.151
(0.145) (0.0472) (0.356) (0.0222) (0.161) (0.0509) (0.376 ) (0.0245)
4 0.545*** 0.113** -0.351 0.138*** 0.191 0.466*** 0.0922 -0.223 0.152*** 0.131
(0.149) (0.0558) (0.364) (0.0221) (0.164) (0.0577) (0.38) (0.0242)
5 0.600*** 0.179** -0.816** 0.142*** 0.236 0.533*** 0.164** -0.700* 0.153*** 0.173
(0.156) (0.0686) (0.351) (0.0224) (0.17) (0.0735) (0.374) (0.0241)
6 0.589*** 0.371*** -1.596*** 0.141*** 0.323 0.524*** 0.405*** -1.626*** 0.153*** 0.279
(0.154) (0.0534) (0.223) (0.0219) (0.167) (0.0559) (0.254) (0.0234)
7 0.569*** 0.357*** -1.456*** 0.143*** 0.281 0.498*** 0.401*** -1.494*** 0.155*** 0.235
(0.153) (0.0569) (0.201) (0.0216) (0.166) (0.0564) (0.231) (0.0231)
8 0.546*** 0.362*** -1.501*** 0.141*** 0.279 0.476*** 0.405*** -1.523*** 0.154*** 0.233
(0.141) (0.0552) (0.168) (0.0208) (0.153) (0.0562) (0.214) (0.0225)
8 + controls 0.224 0.332*** -1.104*** 0.808*** 0.425 0.207 0.322*** -0.973*** 1.004*** 0.384
(0.148) (0.0531) (0.205) (0.196) (0.153) (0.0750) (0.306) (0.239)
Note: The top and bottom panels show the results for PIS 1 and PIS 2 measures of political instability,
with ANPISi defined as the average neighbors political instability PIS 1 and PIS 2, respectively. Each row
reports the estimation results for INTERi being a dummy for the number of the main trade
partners-nonneighbors as specified in the first column. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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partners-nonneighbors, and estimate (2) using each of these dummies. Table 5 reports the
results. We obtain that having six or more main trade partners-nonneighbors generally
reduces or completely eliminates the impact of neighbors’ political instability on a given
country’s political instability. This result is robust to the inclusion of controls, holds for the
full sample and for the sample of developing countries, and is consistent with the hypothesis
postulated in the previous section: Countries can protect their political climates from the
impact of their geographical neighbors by diversifying their trade relations.
What is the intuition behind this result? Table 4 shows that having more trading partners-
nonneighbors or larger trade volume are not sufficient to reduce the negative influence of
geographical neighbors on a given country. Countries in the sample have around 15 trade
partners with trade flows above 1% of total trade flows, on average, and around 13 out of
these trade partners are non-neighbors. However, only around half of the countries have non-
neighbor main trade partners and around 60% of the countries have either first or second main
trade partner neighbor (Table 6). It has been widely recognized that geographical proximity
is one of the main predictors of bilateral trade and the volume of trade flows is negatively
correlated with bilateral distance (as explained by the Gravity models of trade conceptualized
by Tinbergen, 1962 and well explained, for example, in Head and Mayer, 2014). Therefore,
having six or more main trade partners non-neighbors is not a conventional practice and
might indicate a particular policy. The results from Table 5 suggest that this policy is
efficient at reducing the neighbors’ impact on a country’s political instability.
4 Conclusion
This study investigated the relationship between a given country’s and its neighbors’ political
instability and the ability of international non-neighbor partners to affect this relationship.
We found that regional instability defined as the average political instability of the contiguous
countries has a strong positive effect on a given country’s political instability. However,
this effect can be reduced through active participation in international intergovernmental
organizations or through economic relations with successful non-neighbor countries.
Our results suggest that policies targeting the development of international relations with
21
politically stable countries initiated either by the country affected by regional instability or by
the foreign countries-potential partners can be an efficient remedy to “the neighbor’s curse.”
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Appendix
Table 6: Summary Statistics
All Countries Developing Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES N mean sd min max N mean sd min max
PIS 1 138 2.139 0.883 0.467 4.362 112 2.378 0.762 0.959 4.362
PIS 2 122 0.154 0.221 0 0.750 98 0.178 0.227 0 0.750
ANPIS 1 138 2.265 0.679 0.560 3.608 112 2.460 0.532 1.014 3.608
ANPIS 2 135 0.157 0.169 0 0.708 110 0.180 0.166 0 0.708
NEIGHB. NEIGHB. AVG. PIS 1 138 1.633 0.594 0 2.752 112 1.773 0.511 0 2.752
NEIGHB. NEIGHB. AVG. PIS 2 122 0.112 0.102 0 0.419 98 0.129 0.0982 0 0.419
LAREA 138 12.18 1.699 6.534 16.05 112 12.37 1.519 9.222 16.05
LPOP 138 16.11 1.512 12.54 20.98 112 16.13 1.500 12.54 20.98
LATITUDE SQ 138 0.100 0.101 0 0.360 112 0.0778 0.0859 0 0.348
LONGITUDE 138 0.141 0.524 -1.180 1.440 112 0.142 0.542 -0.970 1.440
POLARIZ 138 0.476 0.248 0.0394 0.930 112 0.514 0.236 0.0394 0.930
AN LPOP 138 16.66 1.057 14.80 20.92 112 16.67 1.047 15.04 20.92
AN LAREA 138 12.81 1.242 8.980 16.33 112 12.92 1.136 10.22 16.33
DEMOCRACY 138 6.058 3.061 0.132 10 112 5.506 2.801 0.132 9.912
LGDP 138 7.937 1.615 5.000 11.24 112 7.350 1.157 5.000 9.519
AVG. NEIGHB. LATITUDE SQ 138 0.0986 0.0954 0.000400 0.360 112 0.0769 0.0795 0.000400 0.325
CE 133 0.226 0.420 0 1 109 0.119 0.326 0 1
OPEC 133 0.0902 0.288 0 1 109 0.0826 0.277 0 1
CIOB 133 24.20 7.044 11 38 109 22.45 5.942 11 35
CIOC 133 6.609 4.737 0 20 109 5.339 3.695 0 17
CIOD 133 15.01 9.739 0 46 109 13.50 8.475 0 34
TOTAL TRADE VOLUME (VOL) 136 0.333 0.248 0.0280 2.023 110 0.321 0.255 0.0280 2.023
TOTAL # TRADEPARTN (PARTN) 136 15.66 4.637 4.158 25.42 110 15.42 4.719 4.158 25.42
TRADE VOLUME NONNEIGHB (VOL NN) 136 0.813 0.185 0.216 1.000 110 0.827 0.181 0.216 1.000
# TRADEPARTN NONNEIGHB (PARTN NN) 136 13.43 4.065 3.947 22.58 110 13.26 4.113 3.947 22.58
1 IF # MAIN TRADEPARTN NONNEIGHB=1 136 0.537 0.500 0 1 110 0.564 0.498 0 1
1 IF # MAIN TRADEPARTN NONNEIGHB=2 136 0.324 0.470 0 1 110 0.336 0.475 0 1
1 IF # MAIN TRADEPARTN NONNEIGHB=3 136 0.265 0.443 0 1 110 0.282 0.452 0 1
1 IF # MAIN TRADEPARTN NONNEIGHB=4 136 0.213 0.411 0 1 110 0.236 0.427 0 1
1 IF # MAIN TRADEPARTN NONNEIGHB=5 136 0.176 0.383 0 1 110 0.191 0.395 0 1
1 IF # MAIN TRADEPARTN NONNEIGHB=6 136 0.147 0.355 0 1 110 0.155 0.363 0 1
1 IF # MAIN TRADEPARTN NONNEIGHB=7 135 0.119 0.324 0 1 109 0.119 0.326 0 1
1 IF # MAIN TRADEPARTN NONNEIGHB=8 134 0.0970 0.297 0 1 109 0.101 0.303 0 1
TRADE SHARE 1st MAIN TRADEPARTN 136 0.305 0.162 0.0993 0.821 110 0.322 0.163 0.125 0.821
TRADE SHARE 2nd MAIN TRADEPARTN 136 0.131 0.0395 0.0358 0.240 110 0.133 0.0402 0.0465 0.240
TRADE SHARE 3rd MAIN TRADEPARTN 136 0.0883 0.0239 0.0170 0.155 110 0.0878 0.0236 0.0170 0.155
TRADE SHARE 4th MAIN TRADEPARTN 136 0.0649 0.0191 0.0129 0.114 110 0.0634 0.0192 0.0129 0.114
TRADE SHARE 5th MAIN TRADEPARTN 136 0.0513 0.0152 0.00986 0.0848 110 0.0499 0.0153 0.00986 0.0827
TRADE SHARE 6th MAIN TRADEPARTN 136 0.0410 0.0122 0.00487 0.0717 110 0.0399 0.0123 0.00487 0.0667
TRADE SHARE 7th MAIN TRADEPARTN 136 0.0341 0.0105 0.00265 0.0603 110 0.0334 0.0108 0.00265 0.0603
TRADE SHARE 8th MAIN TRADEPARTN 136 0.0290 0.00946 0.00190 0.0514 110 0.0285 0.00965 0.00190 0.0514
1 IF DEVELOPING COUNTRY 138 0.812 0.392 0 1 112 1 0 1 1
Note: The first five columns report summary statistics for the full sample; the last five columns report
summary statistics for developing countries. Data sources: all the data is from the World Bank or Quality
of Government Dataset by Teorell et al. (2016), except for all PIS 2 variables which are calculated from the
data by Goemans et al., (2009); POLARIZ taken from Alesina et al., (2003); and all TRADE variables
calculated from the data by Fouquin and Hugot (2016) .
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